Nothing? Wash.?Times ?says about Kagan’s views on?the?First Amendment is true
A Washington Times editorial advanced numerous falsehoods in order to paint Elena Kagan as anti-free speech, including the false claim that Kagan has argued that the government could ban pamphlets such as Thomas Paine’s Common Sense.
Kagan has not argued that the government can ban pamphlets like Common Sense
Wash. Times falsely claims that Kagan’s First Amendment work “suggests she might restrict Thomas Paine, circa 1776, from distributing his famous pamphlet.” From a May 18 Washington Times recently told The Washington Post, “It’s a mistake to assume that every argument an SG makes on behalf of the government reflects her personal legal philosophy.” Indeed, the Times editorial itself acknowledges that “it isn’t always fair to ascribe personally to solicitors general the positions they argue in court on the government’s behalf.” However, the Times adds: “it is fair if the arguments they use in court echo ones they made in private practice,” and then proceeds to distort Kagan’s scholarly articles on the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court agrees with Kagan’s statement that the government can restrict some categories of speech
Wash. Times suggests that Kagan’s statement that categories of speech can be restricted is controversial. From the Times editorial:
In the government’s brief in a case called United States v. Stevens, Ms. Kagan elaborated: “Whether a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs.” Whoa, Nellie, who — pray tell — does the balancing? Judges? Bureaucrats? The Almighty President?
In fact, the Supreme Court has long held that some categories of speech — such as child pornography — can be restricted orbanned because their potential for harm outweighs their societal value. In the brief the Times cites, Kagan notes that the Supreme Court has banned entire categories of speech — including fighting words and child pornography. Indeed, in a R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, which invalidated an anti-hate speech law enacted in St. Paul, Minnesota. Kagan argued that the R.A.V. decision was based on St. Paul’s “illegitimate, censorial motives” in passing the law — not on the ways in which the law might have impermissibly “skewed” public debate. Kagan wrote:
Finally, the notion of a skewing effect, as an explanation of R.A.V. or any other case, rests on a set of problematic foundations. The argument assumes that “distortion” of the realm of ideas arises from — and only from — direct governmental restrictions on the content of speech. But distortion of public discourse might arise also (or instead) from the many rules of property and other law that, without focusing or intending to focus on any particular speech, determine who has access to expressive opportunities. If there is an “overabundance” of an idea in the absence of direct governmental action — which there well might be when compared with some ideal state of public debate — then action disfavoring that idea might “unskew,” rather than skew, public discourse. Suppose, for example, that racists control a disproportionate share of the available means of communication; then, a law like St. Paul’s might provide a corrective.
A court well might — as the R.A.V. Court did — refuse the government the power to provide this corrective, but to do so, the court must discard a rationale focused purely on effects and adopt a rationale focused on motive.
[…]
The worry in a case like R.A.V. is not with skewing effects per se; the fear of skewing effects depends upon, and becomes meaningless without, the fear that impermissible considerations — call them for now “censorial” or “ideological” considerations — intruded on the decision to restrict expression.
The R.A.V. Court made this concern about illegitimate, censorial motives unusually evident in its opinion, all but proclaiming that sources, not consequences, forced the decision. [Kagan, “Private Speech, Public Purpose,” 1996, wrote:
On then to my own evaluation of the First Amendment articles: I think they’re excellent. I disagree with them in significant ways (this article, for instance, reaches results that differ quite a bit from those suggested by Kagan’s Private Speech, Public Purpose article, see, e.g., PDF pp. 8-9). But I like them a lot.
[…]
My guess is that the likeliest bet would be to say that a Justice Kagan would be roughly where Justice Ginsburg is — generally pretty speech-protective, but probably with some exceptions in those areas where the liberal Justices on the Court have taken a more speech-restrictive view, chiefly expensive speech related to campaigns and religious speech in generally available government subsidies. Not perfect from my perspective, but not bad, and no worse than Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg largely agreed on such matters.
Former Chicago Law School Dean Stone: Kagan approached First Amendment issues “without even a hint of predisposition.”Geoffrey R. Stone, a law professor at the University of Chicago who was dean when Kagan was hired there, wrote in a May 10 article:
In her formative years as a scholar, Kagan wrote a series of illuminating articles about freedom of speech. They were illuminating not only because they shed interesting light on the First Amendment, but also because they reveal a lot about Kagan. In an area rife with ideology, her articles addressed complex and weighty legal questions without even a hint of predisposition.
In one early essay, she addressed the provocative issue of hate speech. After examining the question in a rigorous, lawyerlike manner, she came out in full support of a highly controversial 5-4 decision authored by none other than conservative Justice Antonin Scalia, which held that the government cannot constitutionally ban hate speech. Kagan reached this result even though it was clearly contrary to the liberal orthodoxy at the time.
Even Fox News’ Megyn Kelly says Kagan “seems pretty middle of the road” on “free speech matters.” From the May 11 edition of The O’Reilly Factor (retrieved from Nexis):
KELLY: Well, I have to say on free speech, Elena Kagan, so far this is something she’s written a lot about, seems pretty middle of the road. I don’t expect her to be a far left liberal on free speech matters.
NY Times reports there are indications Kagan’s “views on government regulation of speech were closer to the Supreme Court’s more conservative justices, like Antonin Scalia.” The New York Times reported in a May 14 article:
In her early years as a law professor, Elena Kagan wrote almost exclusively on the First Amendment. There are indications in those writings that her views on government regulation of speech were closer to the Supreme Court’s more conservative justices, like Antonin Scalia, than to Justice John Paul Stevens, whom she hopes to replace.
